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Something about personal jurisdiction seems to bring out the worst in the 
Supreme Court. In the last twenty-four years, the Court has decided four 
personal jurisdiction cases, and in three of them, it has been unable to muster a 
majority opinion. 1 Between Burnham v. Superior Court in 1990, and J. 
Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown in 2011, the Court's composition has almost completely changed, 
with only Justices Scalia and Kennedy remaining.2 Yet, the current Court is just 
as splintered as the old one. Personal jurisdiction also seems to inspire foolish 
remarks and poor opinions, and Nicastro may set a new low in that regard. 
At least part of the problem sterns from confusion over the sovereignty 
limitations inherent in personal jurisdiction, and the relationship between 
sovereignty concerns and due process in personal jurisdiction analysis. This 
confusion plays out vividly in Nicastro, with Justice Kennedy asserting that the 
problem with Justice Brennan's approach in Asahi was that "[i]t discarded the 
central concept of sovereign authority in favor of considerations of fairness and 
foreseeability."3 By contrast, Justice Ginsburg asserts that "constitutional limits 
on a state court's adjudicatory authority derive from considerations of due 
process, not state sovereignty."4 Both statements are wrong, or are at least 
misleading. 
In this symposium contribution I do two things. First, I explore the 
relationship between sovereignty and due process in personal jurisdiction 
*Dean and Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. I am very grateful to 
Richard Freer and Corinna Lain for their comments and suggestions. 
I. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (20 11) (decided by a 
majority of the Court); J. Mcintyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (plurality 
opinion); Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (plurality opinion); Asahi Metal Indus. 
Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (plurality opinion). 
2. Compare Burnham, 495 U.S. at 606-07, with Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2785. 
3. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 (plurality opinion). 
4. !d. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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doctrine. Second, I examine how confusion about this relationship is manifested 
in some of the more problematic aspects of the Nicastro opinions. I conclude 
that, although at one time the concept of sovereignty provided an important 
analytic component of personal jurisdiction analysis, this is largely no longer 
true. 
I. BACK TO THE FOUNTAINHEAD: PENNOYER V. NEFF 
Much of the credit (or blame) for modem personal jurisdiction doctrine dates 
back to Pennoyer v. Neff.5 It is there that the Court explicitly addressed concerns 
about sovereignty and, for the first time, introduced the Due Process Clause into 
personal jurisdiction doctrine.6 However, these two elements-sovereignty and 
due process-were approached in Pennoyer quite differently than they are 
described in modem opinions, so it is worth revisiting what Pennoyer actually 
said. 
Justice Field's personal jurisdiction analysis began by focusing on states and 
the scope of their power. He noted that except as limited by the Constitution, 
states "possess and exercise the authority of independent States," and that the 
principles of international law concerning personal jurisdiction are applicable to 
the states. 7 He then laid out what he believed to be universal and undisputed 
principles of public international law-that "every State possesses exclusive 
jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory," and 
that "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or 
property without its territory."8 From these principles, Justice Field concluded 
that in-state service is a necessary prerequisite for personal jurisdiction. 9 
To the extent that Field believed that in-state service is a necessary corollary 
of territorial boundaries, the opinion is undeniably wrong. Many territorially 
defined nations do not agree that in-state service is either necessary or 
sufficient. 10 Nonetheless, Field's broader analytic approach is significant. In 
determining the scope of state judicial authority, his analysis focused on the 
state, not the defendant. Field formulated his jurisdictional inquiry by asking 
what power a state has over people inside and outside its boundaries, rather than 
asking when defendants are subject to jurisdiction.ll Additionally, Field saw 
nothing in our federal structure that limits our states differently than nations are 
limited with respect to the substantive scope of their personal jurisdiction 
5. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
6. See id. at 722, 733. 
7. /d. at 722. 
8. /d. (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICf OF LAWS 19-20 (2d ed. 
1841); HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 110-11 (George Grafton Wilson 
ed., WilliamS. Hein & Co. photo. reprint 1995) (Richard Henry Dana, Jr. ed., 1866)). 
9. /d. at 733. 
10. See Russell J. Weintraub, An Objective Basis for Rejecting Transient Jurisdiction, 22 
RUTGERS L.J. 611, 613-16 (1991). 
11. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722. 
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authority. 12 He therefore looked to international law as a source for delineating 
the scope of sovereign authority that states possess with respect to personal 
jurisdiction. 13 Whether or not his understanding of international law was correct, 
this part of the opinion puts states, and the scope of their sovereign authority, at 
the center of its analysis. 
The real innovation of Pennoyer was not the focus on sovereignty, but rather 
the introduction of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a 
basis to refuse to enforce a judgment. Justice Field began this part of the 
analysis by noting that under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, one state was not 
required to enforce a judgment from another state that was void under the 
principles of jurisdiction he had laid out. 14 However, because the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause is applicable only to judgments where enforcement is sought in 
another state, Justice Field was concerned that a void judgment might 
nonetheless be enforceable within the rendering state: 
[I]f the whole proceeding, without service upon him or his appearance, 
is coram non judice and void; if to hold a defendant bound by such a 
judgment is contrary to the first principles of justice,-it is difficult to 
see how the judgment can legitimately have any force within the State. 15 
As troubled as he was by the prospect of a state enforcing its own void judgment, 
Justice Field recognized that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not provide a 
basis for challenging an intra-state enforcement of a void judgment and "there 
was no mode of directly reviewing such judgment or impeaching its validity 
within the State where rendered." 16 It was at this point that Justice Field turned 
to the Due Process Clause: 
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned, 
and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that 
proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and 
obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not 
constitute due process oflaw. 17 
Thus, the Due Process Clause provided a hook to allow an intra-state challenge 
to a judgment rendered in violation of the principles of sovereignty and 
international law that he had earlier described. 
12. See id. 
13. See id. at 729 (citing D' Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1850)). 
14. /d. (citing M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. 312, 327 (1839)). 
IS. /d. at 732. 
16. /d. 
17. /d.at733. 
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Significantly, although Justice Field invoked the Fourteenth Amendment as 
a tool for challenging a judgment rendered without jurisdiction, the Court 
nowhere suggested that the Due Process Clause provided the substantive criteria 
for jurisdiction. This is evident in the structure of the opinion. The principles of 
jurisdiction are found in the beginning of the opinion before the discussion of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 18 The Due Process Clause was introduced towards the 
end of the opinion after Field had already delineated the scope of states' 
jurisdictional authority. Treating the Due Process Clause as a tool to challenge 
enforcement of a judgment, but not as a source of the substantive criteria, also 
allows Pennoyer to fit more comfortably within the preexisting Full Faith and 
Credit Clause cases which had long reco~nized the existence of limits on 
personal jurisdiction and which Field cited. 1 Under Pennoyer' s approach, the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause continues to control in the inter-state context and 
the Due Process Clause simply provides a vehicle to transport the principle 
developed in the interstate full faith and credit context to the intra-state context. 
Using the Due Process Clause as a tool to challenge invalid judgments, but 
not as the source of the standards for validity, is completely consistent with the 
principle that the Due Process Clause protects individual rights. Due process 
requires that a judgment be rendered by a court of competent juris diction. 20 The 
right that is protected by that clause is the right not to have liberty or property 
taken by a state that is acting "coram non judice"-without legitimate 
authority. 21 
Thus, from a broad structural perspective, Pennoyer established several 
noteworthy propositions. First, the state and an understanding of the scope of 
state power is the appropriate starting point for analyzing personal jurisdiction. 
Second, there is nothing unique in our federal structure that requires substantive 
limitations on our states that are different from those that exist in the 
international context. Third, the Due Process Clause provides a basis for 
resisting in-state enforcement of a judgment that exceeds a state's legitimate 
authority, but it does not provide the standards for determining the scope of each 
state's jurisdictional reach. Over the next century and a half, all three of these 
propositions were altered, although in most cases without explicit reexamination. 
18. See id. at 721-23. 
19. See id. at 729-30 (citing D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165, 174 (1850) (holding that a 
New York judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit in Louisiana because one of the 
defendants was not served with process); M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. 312, 327 (1839) (holding 
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause applied only when the court rendering the decision had 
jurisdiction of the parties)). 
20. See id. at 733. 
21. See id. 
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ll. DUE PROCESS AS A SOURCE OF SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS 
Although Pennoyer introduced the Due Process Clause as a mechanism that 
would allow a direct challenge to excessive exercises of jurisdiction, by the 
twentieth century the Due Process Clause began to assume a more substantive 
role. This is apparent in the way the Supreme Court and litigants began to frame 
and understand the issue presented in personal jurisdiction cases. Consider Hess 
v. Pawloski.Z2 In that case, a Massachusetts statute designated a state official to 
be the agent for service of process for any non-resident who drove a car into 
Massachusetts and was subsequently sued on a claim arising out of an 
automobile accident in Massachusetts.Z3 If the issue were framed using the 
structure described in Pennoyer, the question presented would have been 
whether in acting pursuant to this statute, Massachusetts lacked legitimate 
authority and, as a result, enforcement of any subsequent judgment would have 
violated the Due Process Clause. Not surprisingly, that awkward formulation 
was framed instead as "whether the Massachusetts enactment contravenes the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."24 
While Hess's statement of the issue presented might have reflected simply a 
more streamlined use of language, by the time of International Shoe,25 it was 
clear that the Due Process Clause was providing substantive criteria. In what is 
probably the most widely quoted sentence from International Shoe, Justice Stone 
suggests that the substantive criteria for personal jurisdiction derives from due 
process: 
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a 
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the 
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice."26 
Under the Pennoyer approach, the due process violation consisted of enforcing a 
judgment rendered by a court that lacked legitimate authority, but the standards 
for determining legitimacy were derived separately from that clause. In contrast, 
International Shoe suggests that the Due Process Clause itself embodies certain 
criteria for legitimacy. 
In World- Wide Volkswagen/7 the transformation of due process from a 
mechanism to allow a direct challenge of jurisdiction to the source of substantive 
22. 274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
23. ld. at 354 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, as amended by Stat. 1923, ch. 431, 
§ 2 (current version at MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 90 § 3A (West 2001)). 
24. Id. at 355. 
25. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
26. ld. at 316 (emphasis added) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 (1940)). 
27. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
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standards by which to assess such a challenge was so complete that the Court 
could, without notice or apparent embarrassment, misstate the actual holding of 
Pennoyer. The majority opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen, citing Pennoyer, 
stated: "A judgment rendered in violation of due process is void in the rendering 
State and is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere."28 However, the more 
accurate description of Pennoyer's holding would have been: If a judgment is 
void and not entitled to full faith and credit, then it would violate due process to 
enforce it in the rendering state.29 The inversion of the holding is significant 
because it makes due process the source of the substantive standards for 
jurisdiction, which in turn facilitated the shift to a defendant-focused approach. 
III. THE ROLE OF SOVEREIGNTY 
Pennoyer began the analysis of personal jurisdiction by focusing on the state 
and its characteristics, and having concluded that our states are in all relevant 
respect like nations, looked to international law as the source of guidance. 30 
Pennoyer's analysis might therefore be called "sovereignty-based" because it 
focused on the nature of states and relied on a body of law-international law-
that is similarly state-based in its focus. Modern jurisdictional cases have moved 
away from the state-based analytic approach that Justice Field used in Pennoyer. 
It is the defendant, not the state, that is at the center of the analysis, and 
international law has virtually disappeared as a relevant touchstone. It is true 
that the cases include frequent references to "sovereignty" and "federalism," but 
these words have little analytic significance. 
The shift that put the defendant rather than the state at the center of the 
jurisdictional inquiry is strikingly evident in International Shoe. The underlying 
issue in that case was whether it was constitutional for Washington to extract 
unemployment taxes from the out-of-state defendant corporation, and the 
litigants thought that the primary issue concerned the power to tax, not personal 
jurisdiction.31 The majority opinion deals with the taxing power only briefly at 
the end of the opinion and makes clear that the state's taxing power is obvious in 
this case.32 Yet, the opinion does not address the relationship between this 
holding and the question of personal jurisdiction. Given the tax exception in 
choice of law, 33 had the Court not found personal jurisdiction, Washington could 
have been effectively powerless to collect this tax. The Court's failure to 
28. Id. at 291 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,732-33 (1878)). 
29. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 732-33. 
30. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9. 
31. See /nt'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 311; Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a 
Salesman? Forum Shopping and Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 769,798-99 (1995). 
32. See lnt'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 321. 
33. See generally Robert L. Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental 
Claims, 46 HARV. L. REV. 193, 215-17 (1932). 
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consider the state's need for the tools to collect those taxes it was due, 
dramatically highlights that state power was no longer the analytical starting 
point. In place of a focus on the sovereignty needs of the state, Justice Stone 
created, largely out of whole cloth,34 the now famous language that the defendant 
must have "certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance 
of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
. t' ,,35 JUS lCe. 
Justice Black, in his prescient concurrence in International Shoe, recognized 
that although the majority's holding expanded state jurisdictional authority, its 
analytic approach was not state-centered and indeed threatened state power. 36 
He understood that states needed jurisdictional power in order to fully exercise 
other legitimate interests in protecting their citizens and implementing their 
laws. 37 He expressed the concern that "fairness" might be used to restrict the 
power of states to exercise judicial authority in support of their other legitimate 
interests, writing: 
I believe that the Federal Constitution leaves to each State, without 
any "ifs" or "buts," a power to tax and to open the doors of its courts for 
its citizens to sue corporations whose agents do business in those States. 
Believing that the Constitution gave the States that power, I think it a 
judicial deprivation to condition its exercise upon this Court's notion of 
"fair play," however appealing that term may be. Nor can I stretch the 
meaning of due process so far as to authorize this Court to deprive a 
State of the right to afford judicial protection to its citizens on the 
ground that it would be more "convenient" for the corporation to be 
sued somewhere else. 38 
Justice Black went on to observe: "True, the State's power is here upheld. But 
the rule announced means that tomorrow's judgment may strike down a State or 
Federal enactment on the ground that it does not conform to this Court's idea of 
natural justice."39 
Not surprisingly, Justice Black later dissented in Hanson v. Denckla,40 a case 
that further reinforced the shift away from the state as the analytic starting point 
of the personal ~urisdiction analysis. Cases such as McGee v. International Life 
Insurance Co.4 and Hess v Pawloskz42 had focused on the state's interest in 
34. See Cameron & Johnson, supra note 31, at 809-10. 
35. lnt'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 (1940)). 
36. See id. at 323 (Black, J., concurring). 
37. See id. 
38. /d. at 324-25. 
39. /d. at 326. 
40. 357 U.S. 235, 256 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting). 
41. 355 u.s. 220, 223-24 ( 1957). 
42. 274 u.s. 352, 356 (1927). 
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providing a forum. These cases were dismissed by the Hanson majority as 
exceptions,43 and the Court offered a new verbal formulation, which added the 
requirement that "the defendant purposefully avail[] itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State."44 The Court cited International 
Shoe as the source of the purposeful availment requirement, though no such 
language appears in that case. International Shoe does say that a state cannot 
assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant "with which the state has no 
contacts, ties, or relations,"45 but the opinion does not say that the contacts must 
have been created by the defendant. 
Justice Black, in his Hanson dissent, focused, as he had in International 
Shoe, on the state. He discussed "Florida's interest" in the dispute and the many 
connections the dispute had with Florida,46 and then observed that: 
[W]here a transaction has as much relationship to a State as Mrs. 
Donner's appointment had to Florida its courts ought to have power to 
adjudicate controversies arising out of that transaction, unless litigation 
there would impose such a heavy and disproportionate burden on a 
nonresident defendant that it would offend what this Court has referred 
to as "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."47 
In other words, Justice Black began by focusing on the state and then turned to 
concerns about the defendant as a kind of second-stage safety valve for the rare 
case that imposed unusual burdens. He was attentive to concerns about 
territoriality, and explained that there was nothing in his approach that was 
indifferent to state boundaries: 
Of course we have not reached the point where state boundaries are 
without significance, and I do not mean to suggest such a view here. 
There is no need to do so. For we are dealing with litigation arising 
from a transaction that had an abundance of close and substantial 
connections with the State of Florida.48 
While Justice Black put the state at the center of the inquiry, the majority in 
Hanson focused on the activities of the defendant and this approach became even 
more frrmly established in World- Wide Volkswagen.49 World- Wide Volkswagen 
43. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251-53; Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Coun, the Due Process 
Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 
u. em. L. REv. 569,621-22 (1958). 
44. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 (citing Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319). 
45. lnt'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. 
46. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 257-59 (Black, J., dissenting). 
47. !d. at 258-59 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. 
at316). 
48. !d. at 260. 
49. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
2012] WHAT'S "SOVEREIGNTY" GOT TO Do WITH IT? 737 
was not a case of a state reaching out to decide a matter in which it had no 
legitimate interest. In that case, a car had exploded within Oklahoma, Oklahoma 
citizens had put their lives at risk trying to rescue the victims, and the plaintiffs 
had spent months in a burn ward in Oklahoma.50 Nonetheless, the Court held 
that there was no jurisdiction in Oklahoma because, according to the majorit(, 
the defendant had not purposefully affiliated itself with the state of Oklahoma. 5 
Despite (or maybe because of) the strong focus on the defendant, rather than 
on the needs or character of the state as a sovereign, the Supreme Court in 
World-Wide Volkswagen tried to situate its approach within broader concerns 
about sovereignty and federalism. The Court observed that states retained "the 
sovereign power to try causes in their courts," but then noted that "[t]he 
sovereignty of each State ... implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its 
sister States."52 Unfortunately, this general observation about the relationship 
among the states does little to illuminate the scope of personal jurisdiction in any 
particular case. Even if it were true that allowing Oklahoma jurisdiction in this 
case would somehow diminish the sovereignty of other states with respect to this 
case, allowing jurisdiction here would also mean that other states would have 
greater power when the tables were turned. 
Not satisfied to talk about sovereignty in general, the Court in World- Wide 
Volkswagen also refers to federalism and describes the Due Process Clause as 
"an instrument of interstate federalism."53 The reference to federalism implies 
that with respect to personal jurisdiction, states within our federal structure must 
have powers that are different from those that foreign nations have. Justice Field 
in Pennoyer thought otherwise,54 and the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen 
never explains why it disagrees with Field. Moreover, as with its discussion of 
sovereignty, the Court never explains the link between federalism and the 
particular jurisdictional test that the Court adopts. Even assuming that states are 
different from nations in some relevant way, what feature of interstate federalism 
necessitates purposeful availment as the appropriate test? The Court does not 
say. Nor does it connect concerns about federalism with its analysis of the facts 
of the particular case. 
Despite the Court's talk about federalism and sovereignty, these concepts do 
not do any analytic work in World- Wide Volkswagen, and neither the state nor 
state sovereignty are at the center of its analysis. The Court does not frame the 
jurisdictional inquiry by asking, "What jurisdictional authority does a state or 
nation have (and need) by virtue of being a sovereign entity?" Instead, the Court 
50. See id. at 288; Charles W. Adams, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson--'The Rest of 
the Story, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1122, 1123-26 (1993). 
51. World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295. 
52. Id. at 293. 
53. ld. at 294. 
54. See supra text accompanying note 30. 
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focuses on the defendant and whether it has acted purposefully to affiliate itself 
with the forum. 55 
Two years after World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court in Insurance Corp. of 
Ireland56 explicitly recognized the reality of modern personal jurisdiction 
doctrine-that it was no longer a state-centered doctrine, but defendant-centered 
instead. As the Court explained: "The personal jurisdiction requirement 
recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction 
on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual 
liberty."57 Of course, as noted above, even when the analysis is not sovereignty-
based, personal jurisdiction remains a doctrine about sovereignty in the 
definitional sense that whatever jurisdictional reach the Court accords a state is 
by definition the scope of its jurisdictional sovereignty. 
In a footnote, the Court explicitly embraced the view that the Due Process 
Clause is the source of the substantive criteria for personal jurisdiction: "The 
restriction on state sovereign power described in World- Wide Volkswagen 
Corp., . .. must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest 
preserved by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the 
personal jurisdiction requirement .... " 58 The Court's analysis includes an 
inaccurate premise-it is not true that the Due Process Clause "is the only source 
of the personal jurisdiction requirement." Limitations on personal jurisdiction 
were addressed under the Full Faith and Credit Clause long before the 
Fourteenth Amendment even existed.59 Still, the statement leaves no doubt that 
the Court has moved away from the more limited function of due process that the 
Court in Pennoyer set forth. 
The Court in Insurance Corp. of Ireland also explicitly rejects "federalism" 
as a restriction on jurisdiction: 
[T]he [Due Process Clause] itself makes no mention of federalism 
concerns. Furthermore, if the federalism concept operated as an 
independent restriction on the sovereign power of the court, it would not 
be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction requirement: Individual 
actions cannot change the powers of sovereignty, although the 
individual can subject himself to powers from which he may otherwise 
be protected. 60 
The Court is certainly correct that the Due Process Clause is not a provision 
directed at federalism. The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to protect 
people (particularly the newly freed slaves) from states, not to protect states from 
55. See World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295. 
56. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982). 
57. /d. at 702. 
58. /d. at 703 n.IO. 
59. See supra text accompanying note 19. 
60. Ins. Corp. of Jr., 456 U.S. at 702-03 n.lO. 
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other states. However, the Court's waiver argument is not particularly 
persuasive. It is not true that a federalism-based constraint on state power would 
preclude waiver by private litigants. Federalism concerns animate the 
limitations on legislative jurisdiction (i.e., choice of law).61 Nonetheless, if the 
parties do not raise a choice of law issue, most courts will apply forum law on 
the theory of party acquiescence. 62 
Notwithstanding Insurance Corp. of Ireland's explicit rejection of 
sovereignty as a core component of personal jurisdiction, the theme of 
sovereigntl has persisted and, as discussed below, returned to center stage in 
Nicastro. 6 One explanation for this persistence is that regardless of whether 
sovereignty does any analytic work, there is a sense in which all personal 
jurisdiction cases are about sovereignty. The power to exercise judicial authority 
is an important element of state sovereignty, just as "legislative jurisdiction"-
the power of a state to regulate conduct through its substantive law-is an 
important aspect of state sovereignty. Sovereignty used in this sense tells us 
nothing about the proper analytic approach to personal jurisdiction, it is simply 
the label we apply to whatever judicial authority is granted to the states. Thus, 
even a defendant-focused approach to personal jurisdiction, or one based solely 
on considerations of fairness, is ultimately about sovereignty since the outcome 
of the analysis tells us, essentially by definition, the extent to which the state will 
be able to exercise this element of sovereign authority. But there is a critical 
difference between using sovereignty in this definitional sense and the approach 
of Justices Field and Black. Those Justices put the state at the center of their 
analytic approach. In contrast, the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen focuses its 
analysis on the defendant and the defendant's conduct, not on the state. Having 
determined that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction, the Court likewise 
determined the scope of Oklahoma's "sovereignty." However, sovereignty is 
what is left at the end of the analysis, rather than the starting point. 
To summarize, the changes since Pennoyer are these: Due process has been 
transformed from a tool to challenge otherwise void judgments into a doctrine 
that provides the standard for assessing whether personal jurisdiction should be 
permitted. Moreover, the core inquiry in personal jurisdiction is no longer a 
state-centered inquiry that focuses on the nature of state sovereignty, but rather a 
defendant-centered inquiry. Finally, the Court has implied, by its references to 
federalism that there is something unique within our federal system that requires 
a different approach to jurisdiction than exists in international law, though it has 
never explicitly articulated what those differences are. 
61. See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Cornrn'n, 294 U.S. 532, 544-47 (1935) 
(discussing full faith and credit limits on choice of law). 
62. See PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFUCf OF 
LAWS 610 (5th ed. 2010). 
63. See infra text accompanying notes 67-71. 
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IV. CONFUSION Now HATH MADE ITS MASTERPIECE64 
The Supreme Court's latest unsuccessful attempt to bring some coherence to 
the area of personal jurisdiction is J. Mcintyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro.65 In 
Nicastro, the Court voted 6-to-3 to reverse New Jersey's exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant, but it could not muster a majority opinion.66 Of 
the three opinions, Justice Kennedy's puts the most apparent reliance on 
sovereignty and federalism, but it uses them least persuasively. 
Much of Justice Kennedy's opinion is devoted to criticizing Brennan's 
opinion in Asahi for "discard[ing] the central concept of sovereign[ty]."67 Yet, 
despite frequent references to sovereignty, it is not clear what Kennedy means. 
He does not seem to mean an analytic approach that puts the state, rather than the 
defendant, at the center of the inquiry because, as Kennedy explains, "it is the 
defendant's actions ... that empower a State's courts to subject him to 
judgment."68 One irony about Kennedy's attack on Brennan, is that Brennan, 
unlike Kennedy, had suggested that the Court should in fact consider the needs 
of the state as a sovereign entity in constructing the rules for personal 
jurisdiction. In his dissent in World- Wide Volkswagen, and again in Burger 
King, Brennan invoked the state's '"manifest interest in providing effective 
means of redress' for its citizens. "69 
In addition to relying on sovereignty as an explanation for the particular rule 
of jurisdiction that he endorses, Kennedy briefly refers to federalism as a 
relevant principle. But, as with sovereignty, the invocation here is largely 
vacuous: "[I]f another State were to assert jurisdiction in an inappropriate case, it 
would upset the federal balance .... "70 Maybe so, but this statement hardly 
explains what constitutes "an inappropriate case." It is hard to see how the 
federal balance would have been upset if the United States adopted jurisdictional 
rules comparable to those used in the European Union that would permit 
jurisdiction at the place of the injury.71 Would federalism really have been 
jeopardized if Oklahoma had been allowed to provide a forum for redress of 
injuries that occurred in Oklahoma in World- Wide Volkswagen? 
Maybe Kennedy's reference to federalism is intended as an indirect way to 
counter Justice Ginsburg's reference to jurisdictional practices internationally. 
Ginsburg notes, for example, that the European Union allows personal 
64. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH act 2, sc. 3. 
65. 131 s. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
66. See id. at 2785. 
67. /d. at 2788 (plurality opinion). 
68. /d. at 2789. 
69. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 300 (1980) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (quoting McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)); see also Burger King 
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 483 (1985) (citing McGee, 355 U.S. at 223). 
70. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion). 
71. See id. at 2803-04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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jurisdiction in tort cases in the place where the harmful event occurs. 72 
Kennedy's opinion, maybe by way of response, refers to "the premises and 
unique genius of our Constitution."73 Justice Field in Pennoyer thought that 
states were sufficiently like nations for purposes of jurisdiction and that 
international law provided the appropriate set of principles.74 Justice Kennedy is 
not alone in ignoring this aspect of Pennoyer, but the invocation of general 
language about the "unique genius of our Constitution" does not begin to explain 
why we have rejected this aspect of Pennoyer. 
What is unique about our federal system is the presence of a Full Faith and 
Credit Clause.75 Among independent nations, a country may exercise its judicial 
sovereignty as it sees fit, but it runs the risk that other nations may not enforce its 
judgments. Unlike independent nations, states are not free to decide for 
themselves which judgments they will and will not enforce. They are also not 
free to enter into treaties or conventions with each other and thereby negotiate 
about what would constitute a sensible allocation of judicial authority. Because 
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, we need a federal standard delineating what 
judgments are enforceable under that clause. But there is nothing in that clause 
that requires the adoption of any particular standard or approach to jurisdiction. 
Justice Field thought that the operative standard under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause was "natural justice" and the "rules of public law which protect persons 
and property within one State from the exercise of jurisdiction over them by 
another."76 Justice Kennedy may think otherwise, but he has identified nothing 
inherent in our federal structure that mandates a particular set of jurisdictional 
rules. 
Notwithstanding Kennedy's insistence that his approach is based on 
sovereignty, it seems instead to be based on a particular notion of individual 
liberty. Kennedy's focus on "purposeful availment" by the defendant and 
"submission"77 suggests that Kennedy believes that defendants have a liberty 
interest in not being subject to the governmental authority of a state with which 
they have not affirmatively affiliated themselves. 
To the extent Kennedy's approach to jurisdiction is informed by a 
conception of state sovereignty, Justice Kennedy apparently believes that states 
have no power or authority separate from what is conferred by the defendant. 78 
Kennedy argues first that the foundational element of personal jurisdiction is 
whether the defendant "manifest[ed] an intention to submit to the power of a 
72. See id. 
73. ld. at 2789 (plurality opinion). 
74. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
75. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
76. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 730 (1878) (quoting Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 
(18 How.) 404,406 (1855)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
77. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2787-88 (plurality opinion) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,414 (1984); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
78. See id. 
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sovereign."79 He explains that "it is the defendant's actions ... that empower a 
State's courts to subject him to judgment."80 In his view, a state's jurisdictional 
authority is conferred in any particular case by the actions of the defendant and 
not by preexisting authority. State courts apparently have no more inherent 
authority than private arbitration panels and are impotent in the judicial arena 
unless and until they have been empowered by the particular defendant. Thus, to 
the extent Kennedy's approach is sovereignty-based, it reflects the view that 
states' sovereign powers are quite limited. 
Kennedy's strong embrace of the language of sovereignty in Nicastro is met 
with an equally strong rejection of the concept by Justice Ginsburg. In her 
dissent, Ginsburg explains that "the constitutional limits on a state court's 
adjudicatory authority derive from considerations of due process, not state 
sovereignty,"81 and that the "modern approach to jurisdiction" gives "prime 
place to reason and fairness." 82 She concludes that "it would undermine 
principles of fundamental fairness to insulate the foreign manufacturer from 
accountability in court at the place within the United States where the 
manufacturer's product caused injury."83 
Justice Ginsburg insists that jurisdiction is a concept grounded solely in due 
process and concerns for the protection of the individual liberty of the 
defendant. 84 Yet ironically, Ginsburg seems to be approaching jurisdiction not 
from the point of view of the individual defendant, but from a broader 
institutional perspective of state power. At one point in her opinion Justice 
Ginsburg asks: 
On what sensible view of the allocation of adjudicatory authority could 
the place of Nicastro's injury within the United States be deemed off 
limits for his products liability claim against a foreign manufacturer who 
targeted the United States (including all the States that constitute the 
Nation) as the territory it sought to develop?85 
Her very phrasing of the question puts the "sensible . . . allocation of 
adjudicatory authority" at the center of her concerns. Likewise, the focus of her 
fairness analysis is not limited to the particular defendant in the case before her. 
Instead, she considers the realities of modern marketing86 and worries about the 
impact of this jurisdictional ruling on domestic producers.87 Thus, while Justice 
79. /d. at 2788. 
80. /d. at 2789. 
81. /d. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
82. !d. at 2800. 
83. /d. at 2801-02. 
84. See id. at 2798. 
85. /d. at 2797. 
86. See id. at 2799-801. 
87. See id. at 2803-04. 
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Ginsburg insists that jurisdiction is a concept anchored in due process, not 
sovereignty, her approach is less defendant-centered and more focused on the 
question of what authority states should be able to exercise in light of the 
realities of modem commercial life. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the topsy-turvy world of personal jurisdiction, Justice Kennedy can assert 
that he is mostly concerned about sovereignty but adopt an approach to 
jurisdiction that seems far more grounded in a particular vision of individual 
liberty. In contrast, Justice Ginsburg can profess that her primary concern is to 
protect due process rights of individuals, but in fact focus on what powers it is 
reasonable for a state to have to address injuries occurring within its borders. 
Conservative Justices, not otherwise known for their aggressive invocation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, can embrace a Due Process Clause that provides 
expansive protection, while more liberal Justices seem to be on the states' rights 
bandwagon, endorsing the power of the states to act without being unreasonably 
limited by federal constitutional provisions. 
If we could hit the doctrinal "reset" button, we might go back to those 
aspects of Pennoyer that have been largely forgotten, but not explicitly 
repudiated. We could begin with the reference point of international law and 
give states the same jurisdictional authority that is generally accepted 
internationally. Due process would not add substantive content, but would 
provide the vehicle to challenge intrastate enforcement of judgments that would 
not be recognized in the interstate context. I recognize that given the political 
heat surrounding references to international law, this is not a likely outcome. A 
more modest alternative would be for the Court to stop invoking sovereignty as 
if it provided some analytical content-probably also not likely. 
A final hopeful sign might be found in the concurrence of Justices Breyer 
and Alito. They did not wade into the doctrinal thicket, but seemed to leave 
open the possibility that with the right case, they would examine the doctrine 
afresh. One can only hope that when the Justices find that case, the Court moves 
away from formulaic invocations of sovereignty and federalism and towards a 
more coherent approach. 
